It has finally happened, although I am tardy noting it here. The Turkish military has launched its incursion into northern Iraq, in an attempt to root out the mountain safe havens of the PKK.

The Turkish army has yet to stage a full-scale ground invasion to supplement the air strikes, and for good reason. It’s winter and the Turks have usually suspended border operations against the PKK at this time of year. The difference now is a new General Chief of Staff, Yasar Bukanit, who is considerably more aggressive against the rebels than his predecessors. More troops have been moved into the predominantly Kurdish southeast since Bukanit assumed his post in August 2006, more or less forcing the confrontations we witnessed this past October.

The other factor restraining the Turkish army is the will of the United States. The Americans claim they are helping the Turks with intelligence on PKK hideouts in an effort to mitigate the possibility that the military action could undermine the only stable region of Iraq. The Americans deny, however, that they approve of the air strikes, only acknowledging that they’ve been given advance notice.

It’s unlikely that the current push will succeed in eliminating the PKK threat. As long as the Turkish establishment refuses to address the long-standing grievances of its Kurdish citizens in a meaningful way, there will be an abundance of fresh recruits. Especially when the Turkish military insists on making new martyrs for the cause.

When I visited one village about an hour outside Diyarbakir—a village burned down twice in the early 90s by the army and only now drawing re-settlers—I was invited into the home of one of its elders for a lunch of yogurt, tea and flatbread. When I hung up my jacket in the living room I noticed a framed picture of a young man, barely out of his teens, posing for the camera in camouflage. It was clearly not a Turkish army uniform. After nipping out to the loo and returning the picture was gone.

In preparation for visiting Turkey, I read several articles and books that argued that the PKK had been marginalized since the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999. Militarily this is largely true, but its influence is undiminished. Almost every Kurd I spoke with expressed respect for the PKK, if not outright support. The lack of substantive progress through democratic means has left a residual admiration for the PKK and its willingness to confront directly the second largest army in NATO.

A last note on the media coverage: almost every news item I’ve seen on the recent fighting bears a caveat that the PKK are fighting for an independent Kurdistan. This is not really true, as the PKK leadership formally renounced this goal not long after Ocalan’s imprisonment. More importantly it suggests that the Kurds who sympathize with the PKK also desire their own state. Not a single Kurd I encountered desired independence from Turkey. Due to the migrations caused by the fighting and economic hardships in the southeast, Kurds are spread thickly throughout the country. Istanbul alone is now home to more than 1 million Kurds, making it the largest Kurdish city in the country.

The picture above is from Kocakoy, one of the villages razed in the ’90s by the army because of its alleged support for the PKK. The man is standing atop the ruins of what was once his family’s home.